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ABSTRACT
Domain generation algorithms (DGAs) are commonly used by bot-
nets to generate domain names through which bots can establish a
resilient communication channel with their command and control
servers. Recent publications presented deep learning, character-
level classifiers that are able to detect algorithmically generated
domain (AGD) names with high accuracy, and correspondingly,
significantly reduce the effectiveness of DGAs for botnet communi-
cation. In this paper we present MaskDGA, a practical adversarial
learning technique that adds perturbation to the character-level rep-
resentation of algorithmically generated domain names in order to
evade DGA classifiers, without the attacker having any knowledge
about the DGA classifier’s architecture and parameters. MaskDGA
was evaluated using the DMD-2018 dataset of AGD names and four
recently published DGA classifiers, in which the average F1-score
of the classifiers degrades from 0.977 to 0.495 when applying the
evasion technique. An additional evaluation was conducted using
the same classifiers but with adversarial defenses implemented: ad-
versarial re-training and distillation. The results of this evaluation
show that MaskDGA can be used for improving the robustness of
the character-level DGA classifiers against adversarial attacks, but
that ideally DGA classifiers should incorporate additional features
alongside character-level features that are demonstrated in this
study to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Intrusion/anomaly detection and
malware mitigation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Botnets are groups of inter-connected devices that are designed to
carry large-scale cyber-attacks [51] such as distributed denial-of-
service [2], data-theft [28], and spam [34]. The design of modern
botnets often involve advanced techniques that challenge the ability
to detect the botnet operation and take it down. Domain generation
algorithms (DGAs) [36], a notorious technique, has been used by
more than 40 documented botnets in the last decade.
Domain generation algorithms are used to generate a large num-
ber of pseudo-random domain names, which are usually based on
the date and a secret input (seed). A bot and its command and con-
trol server that wish to communicate will both execute the DGA
with a shared seed in order to generate a sequence of domain names
and identify the one through which their communication can take
place. DGAs can be used to generate thousands of domain names
per day which must be identified and analyzed in order to shutdown
of the botnet.
The detection of algorithmically generated domain (AGD) names
initially focused on capturing binary samples of bots, extracting
their algorithms and seeds, and generating the domain names in ad-
vance for mitigation [35, 37, 43]. However, by using new input seeds,
this approach can be easily evaded by botnets. In fact, between the
years of 2017 and 2018 at least 150 new seeds were introduced by
botnets,1 a figure which is more than two times the number of
documented DGAs. Using machine learning in order to inspect the
lexicographic patterns of domain names for detecting AGD names
and classify their generating algorithms [46, 52] is an alternative
and more generalized approach.
Machine learning-based DGA detection techniques have become
extremely successful, with state of the art algorithms achieving high
detection rates on multiple datasets [42] with inline latency [23].
These techniques reduce the effectiveness of DGAs for maintain-
ing resilient and stealthy botnet communication. From the botnet
operator’s perspective, a solution that can evade these state of the
art detection mechanisms by using adversarial machine learning
to produce AGD names that are less likely to be detected can be
beneficial.
Adversarial machine learning is a technique in the field of ma-
chine learning which attempts to “fool” models (during either the
training or execution phases) through adversarial input [25], also
referred to as adversarial samples.
In the context of DGA classification, generative adversarial net-
works (GANs) [18] were previously suggested by Anderson et al. [3]
in a method called DeepDGA, in order to to generate adversarial
samples of “fake” domain names that are indistinguishable from
real benign domain names that were available in the training set.
The fake domain names generated are used to augment the training
set with additional benign domain names and accordingly improve
the model’s robustness. Because DeepDGA was trained to gener-
ate domain names that resemble benign domains, the fake domain
names generated are mostly short and readable. This makes the
generated domain names impractical for botnets, since they are
more likely to be used by legitimate users (e.g., the domain name
“laner.com” generated by DeepDGA was already owned by Laner
Electric Supply). In addition, short domain names are usually more
expensive and thus increase the attacker’s costs for maintaining
the botnet communication.
In this paper we explore the ability to evade detection by DGA
classifiers. We present MaskDGA, a black-box adversarial learning
technique that adds perturbations to a character level representation
of an AGD and transforms it to a new domain name that is falsely
classified as benign by DGA classifiers, without prior knowledge
1Based on the change-log of https://data.netlab.360.com/dga/
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of the classifier’s architecture and parameters. MaskDGA can be
applied as an extension to an existing malware to evade detection
on the network perimeter by security solutions (as depicted in
Figure 1).
MaskDGA utilizes the transferability property [30] and is con-
ducted by first training a substitute model on datasets of publicly
known AGD names. The attacker then generates a set of AGD
names to which MaskDGA is applied. The domain names gener-
ated are provided as input to the substitute model and applied in
a single feed forward step. The results of the feed forward step
are used to compute the loss with regards to the benign class.
MaskDGA then performs a single back-propagation step in which
the loss propagates the gradients back to the input to form a Ja-
cobian saliencey map [32] (JSM). Finally, for every domain name
generated, MaskDGA replaces exactly half of the characters that
had the largest gradient values in the JSM, so that the resulting
domain name remains long and likely unreadable. Changing only
half of the characters for a set of randomly generated AGD names
also implies that we can expect a small number of collisions among
the domain names in the output set, and therefore, the number of
domains in the output set will remain close to that of the original set
(created by the DGA). Eventually, the effort required for detecting
and taking down the botnet remains the same.
MaskDGA was designed based on the Jacobian-based saliency
map adversarial attack [32] (JSMA) that was originally applied to
images. In contrast to the JSMA attack, MaskDGA is restricted to (1)
producing valid character-level changes, (2) performing a constant
number of changes, and (3) changing the same feature (character)
only once, thus making it more suitable for character-level DGA
classification evasion.
The evaluation of MaskDGA was performed using the recently
published DMD-2018 dataset of AGD names and open-source DGA
classifiers [12]. We also applied DeepDGA [3] as a technique for
evading the detection models, and compared its performance with
that of MaskDGA. The results show that when applying MaskDGA,
the detection rate degrades from an average F1-score of 0.977 to
0.495, while the DeepDGA attack results in an average F1-score of
0.780.
We also evaluated MaskDGA against the same DGA classifiers
enhanced with adversarial learning defenses, namely adversarial
re-training (using domains generated by DeepDGA [4] and by
MaskDGA) and distillation [33], and assessed their effectiveness.
The results shows that adversarial re-training can be effective to
some extent against the evasion techniques but still leads to the
conclusion that a more resilient detection mechanism is required.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• we present a practical evasion technique for DGA detection
machine learning models;
• the evasion technique can be applied as a wrapper on the
existing DGA source code used by the botnet and therefore
easy to apply;
• the technique is generic and can be applied to any DGA
family and input seed, while adhering to the expected re-
quirements of a DGA, i.e., uniqueness, validity and rareness
of domain names;
• we present an evaluation of the presented evasion technique
using four recently published DGA classifiers, and we as-
sess the robustness of MaskDGA against commonly used
adversarial defense techniques;
• from the presented evasion technique we conclude that the
detection of DGA mechanisms should not rely solely on
character-level DGA features and ideally DGA classifiers
should incorporate additional behavioral features.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Character-level DGA classification
A character-level representation of a wordW over the alphabet of
symbols V is a binary matrix X |W | · |V | s.t.
∀i ∈ [W ], j ∈ [V ] : Xi, j =
{
1 Wi = Vj
0 otherwise
i.e., Xi, j is set to one if the i-th character of the wordW matches
the j-th symbol in the alphabet V and zero if otherwise.
Recently published models for DGA classification [40, 52] are
based on character-level representations of domain names due
to their high accuracy [6] and inline latency [23], provided that
no additional context is required (e.g., network traffic features).
Therefore, the focus of the evasion techniques presented in this
study is on character-level DGA classification.
2.2 Adversarial learning
Adversarial learning attacks can be divided into poisoning attacks
performed during training [7, 9], and evasion attacks performed
during testing [8, 19, 31]. Evasion attacks usually involve adding
perturbation (noise) to the input sample’s features to result in a mis-
classification by the attacked model. Such inputs are also referred to
as adversarial samples. In order to make the targeted model classify
the sample X whose true label is Y as Y ∗, the attacker would have
to find a perturbation δX such that (X + δX ) is classified as Y ∗. If
the attack is aimed at a specific class in the data, it is referred to as
a targeted attack [30].
Attacks also vary based on the knowledge the adversary has
about the classifier. A black-box evasion attack requires no knowl-
edge about the model beyond the ability to query it as a black-box,
i.e., inserting an input and getting the output classification. In a
white-box attack, the adversary can have varying degrees of knowl-
edge about the model architecture, hyper parameters and data used
for training.
Most black-box attacks rely on the concept of adversarial exam-
ple transferability, also known as the transferability property [30].
According to the transferability property, adversarial examples
crafted against one model are also likely to be effective against other
models, even when the models are trained on different datasets (but
assumed to be sampled from the same distribution) [32, 45]. This
means that the adversary can train a substitute model, which has
decision boundaries similar to the original model, and perform a
white-box attack on it, i.e., obtain the back-propagated gradients
in order to add perturbation that would result in the desired target
misclassification. Adversarial examples that successfully fool the
substitute model are likely to fool the original model as well [31].
MaskDGA: A Black-box Evasion Technique Against DGA Classifiers
Figure 1: After training a substitute model (a), and generating a set of AGD names using an existing DGA (b), the attacker
applies MaskDGA as a wrapper to add perturbation to the set of AGD names, which will result in a new set of adversarial
domain names that evade detection (c). The bot operator can register the adversarial AGD names (1) to allow its bots to estab-
lish a communication channel with their command and control server via the adversarial domain names (2-4) while evading
detection on the security perimeter.
In this paper we present a black-box technique aiming at evading
DGA detection models.
3 THREAT MODEL
Training capability (black-box). We assume that the targeted
DGA detection models are not available to the botnet operator, and
therefore the attacker cannot rely on knowledge about the archi-
tecture of the targeted model. However, we assume that the botnet
operator can use publicly available AGD datasets and previously
published architectures in order to train a substitute model.
Targeted misclassification for the benign class. The targeted mod-
els are multiclass DGA classification models whose input is a do-
main name and output is a probability distribution for the set of
DGA classes and the benign class (e.g., [40, 52]). The class with
the maximal value in the output probability distribution is selected
by the DGA classifier as the predicted class. A misclassification
between the various DGA labels would still result in the detection
of the malicious domain name and is therefore considered an un-
successful adversarial attack. Thus, the attacker’s goal is a targeted
misclassification of the adversarial input as the benign class.
4 THE EVASION TECHNIQUE
4.1 Overview
The evasion technique is performed according to the following
main steps (portrayed in Figure 2):
• Training a substitutemodel.The attacker acquires a dataset
of public samples of AGD names and uses it to train a discr-
minative model that distinguishes AGD names from benign
domain name. The model is referred to as the substitute
model.
• Generating the algorithmically generated domainnames.
The attacker executes an existing DGA with a randomly se-
lected seed and generates a set of AGD names.
• Constructing a Jacobian-based saliency map. For every
generated AGD, the attacker performs a single feed forward
step in the substitute model. The results of the feed forward
step are used to compute the loss with regard to the benign
class. The attacker performs a single back-propagation step
on the loss in order to acquire the Jacobian-based saliency
map, which is a matrix that assigns every feature in the input
AGDwith a gradient value. Features (characters) with higher
gradient values in the JSM would have a more significant
(salient) effect on the misclassification of the input AGD
name and hence the name saliency map.
• Adding perturbation to the input AGD name based on
the JSM. For every input AGD name, iterate over every
character position from the first character to the last. For
every position, save the highest salient symbol and its value,
e.g., in the first position the symbol “a” may have the highest
value in the JSM. Set the top half of the character positions
with regard to the maximal saliency values to the symbols
that yielded the maximal saliency values (as portrayed in
Algorithm 1).
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4.2 Training a substitute model
The substitute model is a discrminative model (i.e., classifier) that
distinguishes algorithmically generated domain names from benign
domain names. The input layer of the model accepts character-level
domain name features in the feed forward step and then reads
the gradient for every feature in the back-propagation step for the
construction of the JSM. The output layer of the model can be either
binary (e.g., DGA or benign) or multiclass to predict the specific
DGA. Formally, the substitute model learns a function F that accepts
an input domain name X with a predicted class Y . These notations
are later used in Algorithm 1.
4.3 Generating the domain names
The generation of original AGD names can be executed either
by botnets that already have a DGA mechanism implementation
and are looking to extend it to evade detection, or by a new DGA
implementation. Although the evasion technique works regardless
of the selected DGA, the attacker should take into account two
considerations: the average length and the number of generated
domain names.
The average length of the generated domain names represents
a trade-off between the ease of evasion and the availability of the
domain name generated for botnet communication. AGD names
that are shorter (usually less than eight symbols) have a higher
chance of being readable. Readable domain names have greater
likelihood of evading detection, but on the other hand, they are
more likely to be owned by legitimate users and thus unavailable
for attacks. In addition, MaskDGAmight make the provided domain
names even more readable (while maintaining their length) and
accordingly less available. In contrast, longer domain names are
likely to be available and inexpensive. However, DGA classifiers
are sensitive to the length of the domain names and are more
likely to predict longer than average domain names as AGD names,
regardless of their characters.
The number of generated domain names represents another
trade-off between stealthy communication and resilient communi-
cation. DGAs that produce a very large number of domain names
(e.g., thousands per day) are more difficult for take-down but are
easier to identify because of the overall noise. An alternative is a
DGA that produces a smaller number of domain names to choose
a more stealthy communication. For instance: Banjori, Conficker
and Gameover Zeus DGAs which generate thousands of domain
names per day are ideal in terms of resilience, while Torpig and
Matsnu generate up to three domain names per day and are better
for stealthy communication [36].
4.4 Construct a Jacobian-based saliency map
The construction of the JSM begins by providing the substitute
model with an AGD name X as performing a single feed forward
step. For every AGD name, the feed forward step would provide
a predicted probability distribution for the output classes of the
substitute model. Based on the predicted probability distribution
and the benign class distribution, we compute the targeted loss
function L(F (X ),Y ∗) of the predicted value F (X ) with respect to
the benign classY ∗. The back-propagation algorithm is then applied
on the computed loss from the last hidden layer to the input layer
so that every feature of the input X is assigned with a gradient.
For example, the feature Xi, j will be assigned with the real-value
gradient ∂L(F (X ),Y
∗)
∂X0,0
.
Formally, the JSM (denoted as S) is the set of the back-propagated
gradients for every input feature:
S =

∂L(F (X ),Y ∗)
∂X0,0
∂L(F (X ),Y ∗)
∂X1,0
. . .
∂L(F (X ),Y ∗)
∂X |W |,0
...
...
. . .
...
∂L(F (X ),Y ∗)
∂X0, |V |
∂L(F (X ),Y ∗)
∂X1, |V | . . .
∂L(F (X ),Y ∗)
∂X |W |, |V |

4.5 Adding perturbation to the input AGD
based on the JSM
The input character-level AGD X is added with a perturbation δX
so that following constraints are met:
(1) X + δX is a valid character-level representation of a domain
name (see Subsection 2.1)
(2) Exactly half of the characters of X are replaced
The selection the perturbation δX and the addition of its to
transform X to X ′ is formally described in Algorithm 1. Initially,
the algorithm computes the maximal value for every column in
the JSM. The median of maximal value acts as a threshold and
is henceforth denoted as Θ. MaskDGA replaces the character in
position i to the j-th symbol in the alphabet if and only if the
maximal value for column i of the JSM is j and j > Θ. The character
replacement is performed by adding a perturbation δX in which:
(1) the original symbol is set to (−1),
(2) the new symbol is set to (+1), and
(3) the rest of the symbols are set to zero.
By definition, since Θ is the median of the maximal columns in
the JSM that correspond to character positions, exactly half of the
characters are replaced. The result is a new domain name X ∗ which
is the original X with the perturbation δX that was induced by the
algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Adding perturbation to an algorithmically generated
domain name based on the JSM
INPUT:
X - a character-level AGD name of size |W | · |V |
Y ∗ - the targeted class
F - is the function learned by the substitution model
1: Let S be the saliency map of ∇F (X ) w.r.t. Y ∗
2: X ∗ ← X
3: for i in 0, .., |W | do
4: Sij∗ ← maxj Si, j
5: Let Θ be the median of {S0j∗ , ..., S
|W |
j∗ } ▷ Set the threshold
6: for i in 0, .., |W | do
7: if argmaxj Si, j ≥ Θ then
8: X ∗i, j = 1
9: X ∗
i, j
= 0 for all j , j
10: return X ∗
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Figure 2: The attacker trains a substitute model on a publicly available dataset of AGD (1). A single feed forward step is
performed using the substitute model on an input AGD name to compute the targeted loss with regard to the benign class (2).
The targeted loss with regards to the benign class is used to back-propagate the gradients and construct the Jacobian-based
saliency map (3) and add perturbation to the input AGD based on the JSM to result in a new adversarial domain names that
evades detection (4).
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Overview
In this section we present the experiments conducted in order to
evaluate the MaskDGA evasion technique. MaskDGAwas tested on
four recently presented models which are based on deep learning
DGA classifiers using a public dataset of AGD names.
The experiments focused on evaluating the effectiveness ofMaskDGA
while targeting the attacked models in general, as well as when
focusing on a specific DGA family.
The performance of MaskDGA was compared against two base-
line attacks: (1) a random attack, which selects half of a domain’s
characters at random and replaces them with uniformly selected
characters from the alphabet of English letters, digits, hyphens and
underscores, and (2) an attack based on DeepDGA [3].
The DeepDGA-based attack was conducted using the source code
provided by the authors of [3] with several modifications that were
required in order to use it for the attack. After upgrading the source
code so we could use the newer version of the Keras library [11]
and applying it to a recent Alexa top 500,000 sites (as was done
by Anderson et al. [3]), the generator produced a limited variety
of samples. This is a common challenge in applying GANs, also
known as mode collapse, which expresses the sensitivity of GAN
architectures to minor changes in the configuration such as when
using a different dataset [21]. Our understanding of the problem
was that the generator was quickly over-fitted to the discriminator
and failed to generate new samples. To overcome the mode collapse
state we provided the discriminator with an initial advantage over
the generator by pre-training the discriminator on a preliminary
set of domain names that were generated by the generator before
the training phase.
5.2 Datasets
Themain dataset used for the evaluation is theDMD-2018 dataset [27,
47–49] which contains 100,000 benign domain names and 297,777
algorithmically generated domains that were evenly produced by
twenty different DGA families (see Table 1). The substitute model
that used in MaskDGA was trained on 113,335 randomly selected
domain names (28.9% of the dataset). The targeted models (i.e., the
four DGA classifiers) that we attempted to evade were trained on
264,456 domain names (67.6% of the dataset) to provide the DGA
classifiers with an advantage against the attack. The remaining
9,986 domain names (3.3% of the dataset) were used to test the
effectiveness of MaskDGA. Every domain name in the test set was
perturbed and evaluated against the targeted models.
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Additionally, the alexa.com dataset of top sites 2 was used to train
the initial autoencoder of DeepDGA [4] as conducted by Anderson
et al. [3]. Using the trained DeepDGA, we generated 500 adversarial
domain names that were used to compare with MaskDGA, and an
additional 63,500 domain names were used for the a defense as
explained in Subsection 6.
Table 1: The dataset used for evaluating MaskDGA.
Class Substitute training Targeted training Testing
Benign
benign 27000 63000 -
DGA
banjori 4349 10148 503
corebot 4349 10148 503
dircrypt 4349 10148 503
dnschanger 4349 10148 503
fobber 4349 10148 503
murofet 4349 10148 503
necurs 3704 8644 429
newgoz 4349 10148 503
padcrypt 4349 10148 503
proslikefan 4349 10148 503
pykspa 4349 10148 503
qadars 4349 10148 503
qakbot 4349 10148 503
ramdo 4349 10148 503
ranybus 4349 10148 503
simda 4349 10148 503
suppobox 4349 10148 503
symmi 4349 10148 503
tempedreve 4349 10148 503
tinba 4349 10148 503
Total DGA 86335 201456 9986
Total 113335 264456 9986
The number of domain names in the dataset that are used for the
evaluation. The substitute training set is used by the attacker to
train the substitute model. The targeted training set is used to train
a DGA classifier model that is targeted by the attacker. The test set
contains an additional set of adversarial AGD names that are
tested against the DGA classifiers.
5.3 Substitute model architecture
The architecture of the substitute model has the character-level
(one hot encoding) representation of the domain as the input layer
and an output neuron for every DGA family or benign domain
as the output layer. The hidden layers consist of one-dimensional
CNN filters of size 2, 3, 4, 5, and a max pooling layer that reduces
the domain length to one half of its original and two additional
fully-connected layers. This architecture was chosen because we
wanted to evaluate the effectiveness of MaskDGA when using a
2https://www.alexa.com/topsites
model that is considerably weaker then the attacked DGA detection
classifiers, and because it is lightweight and thus practical to apply.
The training of the substitute model was conducted for five
epochs with batches of 128 domain names until convergence using
the ADAM optimizer [22] with a learning rate of 0.01.
The implementation of the evaluated adversarial evasion tech-
nique was achieved using the Keras library [11] and the TensorFlow
library [1] for the substitute model and the Cleverhans library [29]
for computing the gradients based on the targeted loss, and accord-
ingly the JSM.
The character-level representations inputs for domain names
are based on the vocabulary of English letters, digits, hyphens, un-
derscores and dots. We (hard-coded) restrict the MaskDGA from
adding perturbations that would change a non-dot character to
a dot character. This restriction is designed to avoid the short-
ening of the second-level domain (e.g., “example.com” turns into
“exa.mple.com”) which has undesired effects on the effectiveness of
the evasion technique (as explained in Section 1).
5.4 Targeted (attacked) models’ architecture
The targeted models that MaskDGA tries to evade from detection
are based on the following recently proposed DGA classifiers:
• Endgame [3] which is based on a single LSTM layer (denoted
as LSTM[Endgame])
• CMU [15] which is based on a forward LSTM layer and a
backward LSTM layer (denoted as biLSTM[CMU])
• Invincea [40] which based on parallel CNN layers (denoted
as CNN[Invincea])
• MIT [50] which based on stacked CNN layers and a single
LSTM layer (denoted as CNN + LSTM[MIT])
The targeted models were implemented using the TensorFlow
library [1] and are based on the source code that was published
by [6] and trained on the the set of domain names that are reserved
for the targeted model training in the dataset.
5.5 Evaluation metrics
The metrics used to evaluate the effectiveness of the evasion tech-
niqued on the targeted models are precision, recall, and the F1-score,
as is commonly used for DGA classification evaluation. Based on
the threat model (see Section 3) where the goal is defined as targeted
misclassification, we define the correct class as any DGA, instead
of the specific DGA i.e., the classifier might predict the wrong DGA
class but it is regarded correct as long as it did not misclassify an
AGD as benign.
Precision computes the model’s ability to assign the correct
label out of all the instances in cluster label.
Precision(C,Y ) = correct class
predict class
(1)
Recall computes the model’s ability to retrieve all of the in-
stances of a certain class; i.e., the model’s ability to retrieve
all of the domains of a certain family.
Recall(C,Y ) = correct class
entire class
(2)
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F1 score combines precision and recall together into one score
using harmonic mean
F1(C,Y ) = 2 ∗ precision(C,Y ) ∗ recall(C,Y )
precision(C,Y ) + recall(C,Y ) (3)
5.6 Results
Table 2 presents the precision, recall and F1 measures when apply-
ing the evasion techniques against the four testedmodels (LSTM[Endgame],
biLSTM[CMU], CNN[Invincea], and CNN + LSTM[MIT]). We com-
pare the performance of the targeted models when no attack is
applied (NoAttack), when a random attack is performed (Random),
when a DeepDGA-based attack is performed (DeepDGA), and when
executing the presented evasion technique (MaskDGA).
Based on the results, we can see that when no adversarial attack
is applied (NoAttack), all of the models perform almost perfectly
on the test set. More specifically, the targeted models yield an
average precision (0.977), recall (0.977) and F1-score (0.977), thus
supporting the claim that recently published, deep learning based
DGA classifiers are very accurate in detecting AGD names.
The Random attack shows a degradation in the average preci-
sion (-19%), recall (-26%), and F1-score (-26.5%), compared to the
NoAttack case. This degradation in the evaluation measures indi-
cates that the four targeted models are very sensitive to changes in
the lexical patterns of DGA-based domain names.
The DeepDGA attack consists of generating pseudo-random do-
main names that are sampled from the same distribution of the
benign Alexa top 1M domains using a GAN network. While clearly
degrading the performance of the detection models in comparison
to the NoAttack case, the DeepDGA generated domains are effec-
tively detected by all four models with a higher average precision
(+6%), recall (+5%) and F1-score (+0.3%) compared to the Random
attack. The generation of domain names by DeepDGA relies on
sampling symbols from a pre-trained multinomial regressor that
provides the likelihood for every symbol at a given position. The
sampling is performed independently for every position, and thus
it is not guaranteed that the output domain name would not ap-
pear to be algorithmically generated. The MaskDGA evasion tech-
nique dominates all evaluated attacks on all four targeted models
with an average recall rate of 0.575; i.e., an average DGA classifier
would miss 42.5% of the AGD names compared to only 2.5% in the
NoAttack case.
We were also interested in evaluating the effectiveness of the
evasion technique on specific DGA families that are characterized
by different patterns.
Table 3 presents the F1-score (which reflects the harmonic mean
between the precision and recall) for the twenty DGA families that
are available in the test set.
When NoAttack is applied, a similar average F1-score for all
DGA families is observed. This indicates that the models memorize
the lexicographical patterns of observed domains regardless of their
length.
The Random attack, when focusing on the specific DGA fam-
ilies, results in a more significant degradation for some DGAs
(e.g., Simda, Suppobox) than others (e.g., CoreBot, Symmi). The
Table 2: Evaluation results.
Targeted model Precision Recall F1-score
CNN[Invincea]
No Attack 1.00 1.00 1.00
Random 0.83 0.74 0.73
DeepDGA 0.91 0.80 0.84
MaskDGA 0.68 0.52 0.39
LSTM[Endgame]
No Attack 0.98 0.98 0.98
Random 0.83 0.79 0.78
DeepDGA 0.74 0.73 0.74
MaskDGA 0.73 0.60 0.53
biLSTM[CMU]
No Attack 0.98 0.98 0.98
Random 0.85 0.81 0.81
DeepDGA 0.75 0.82 0.78
MaskDGA 0.72 0.61 0.55
CNN + LSTM [MIT]
No Attack 0.95 0.95 0.95
Random 0.80 0.77 0.77
DeepDGA 0.68 0.92 0.74
MaskDGA 0.63 0.57 0.51
The evaluation metrics of the targeted DGA classifiers on the test
set when no attack is applied (NoAttack), a random attack is
performed (Random), a DeepDGA-based attack is performed
(DeepDGA), and when executing the presented evasion technique
(MaskDGA).
Suppobox DGA is a dictionary-based DGA and therefore its gen-
erated domains appear as normal English terms (e.g., tablethir-
teen.net). Therefore, a random replacement of half of the char-
acters would completely demolish the lexicographical pattern of
Suppobox domains and accordingly the Random attack is highly
effective for Suppobox. However, for DGAs such as CoreBot which
produces long domains with uniformly selected characters (e.g.,
i8a0q2wdu8otulkfylo2gdq.ddns.net) the Random attack is not ef-
fective against all models (e.g., LSTM[Invincea] results with an
average F1-score of 0.91).
The presented MaskDGA evasion technique is dominant over all
DGA families across all targeted models. When MaskDGA is ap-
plied to the Suppobox dictionary-based DGA all targeted models
detect the adversarial domain name with an average F1-score of
0.495. For the more difficult case of the corebot DGA, the average
F1-score is 0.7725, thus arguing that while the longer AGD have
more difficulty in evading detection, MaskDGA still manages to
evade detection.
Note that in this analysis the DeepDGA could not be evaluated (and
thus was omitted) because its input is a seed string and not AGD
that were produced by DGA processes.
Finally, Table 4 contains examples of AGD that were generated
by several DGA families and their adversarial form after adding
perturbation by MaskDGA in order to provide further intuition. As
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Table 3: Evaluation results per DGA family (average F1-score).
Model/DGA
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CNN[Invincea]
No Attack 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Random 0.78 0.91 0.74 0.79 0.79 0.89 0.78 0.88 0.72 0.81 0.80 0.77 0.83 0.78 0.73 0.7 0.70 0.92 0.77 0.76
MaskDGA 0.49 0.67 0.50 0.52 0.49 0.64 0.50 0.56 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.53
LSTM[Endgame]
No Attack 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.89 0.89 0.9 0.9 0.9
Random 0.78 0.89 0.69 0.63 0.84 0.84 0.76 0.85 0.71 0.75 0.73 0.78 0.81 0.84 0.83 0.65 0.69 0.88 0.75 0.74
MaskDGA 0.48 0.82 0.55 0.51 0.67 0.68 0.6 0.65 0.51 0.56 0.58 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.52 0.51 0.68 0.63 0.59
LSTM[CMU]
No Attack 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Random 0.8 0.87 0.78 0.73 0.81 0.81 0.66 0.85 0.71 0.69 0.74 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.71 0.76 0.7 0.87 0.78 0.67
MaskDGA 0.49 0.86 0.61 0.58 0.64 0.66 0.53 0.67 0.49 0.53 0.57 0.58 0.63 0.6 0.55 0.57 0.5 0.81 0.62 0.54
CNN[MIT]
No Attack 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
Random 0.66 0.76 0.63 0.59 0.71 0.72 0.64 0.74 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.67 0.59 0.64 0.75 0.65 0.64
MaskDGA 0.48 0.74 0.5 0.49 0.56 0.62 0.53 0.63 0.48 0.54 0.51 0.52 0.56 0.51 0.53 0.49 0.48 0.64 0.52 0.51
The average F1-score of the targeted DGA classifiers on twenty DGA families when: no attack is applied (NoAttack ), a random attack is performed (Random), and when
executing the presented evasion technique (MaskDGA).
described in Section 4, the characters that are replaced byMaskDGA
are the ones that have the highest saliency with regards to a misclas-
sification as the benign class. Accordingly, the provided examples
inflict two interesting trends. The clearest trend is that the under-
score (“_”) characters is frequently used by MaskDGA since it is
valid and common for benign domain names that appeared on the
DMD-2018 dataset but never appeared on any in the dataset, and at
all to the best of our knowledge.
Another trend is the use of digits, especially in the prefix of do-
main names which is relatively rare for AGD. Also, note that the
pykspa domain “abfmfid.net” resulted in the adversarial domain
name “poqhfid.net” that involves a consonant-vowel-consonant
(CVC) pattern that is common in English readable words, and ac-
cordingly in benign domains.
Table 4: Examples of adversarial domain names generated
by MaskDGA
DGA Original After MaskDGA
qadars 02sygu4egq8m.net _2_yq-apgq8m.net
fobber coclocpxjwgoefjih.net _oclocpxjwfqjf_fh.net
proslikefan csdwxmk.biz lqjw1mk.biz
pykspa abfmfid.net poqhfid.net
tinba bcpprwxhxktb.pw 2___rncqxktb.pw
Example of algorithmically generated domains from six DGA
families in their original and adversarial form.
6 EVALUATION OF ADVERSARIAL DEFENSES
6.1 Overview
The emergence of adversarial attacks was followed by studies that
suggested appropriate defenses. In this section we evaluate the
effectiveness of two common adversarial defenses, namely adver-
sarial re-training and distillation, against the presented MaskDGA
evasion technique.
6.2 Tested defenses
The first defense evaluated is adversarial re-training. In adversar-
ial re-training [53] the training set is augmented with adversarial
samples so that the resulting model is more robust to adversar-
ial samples. While re-training is considered an effective defense
against adversarial samples, it requires prior knowledge of the de-
fender about the attack and it does not necessarily generalize to
other attacks [19].
We tested two different adversarial re-training processes: re-training
using MaskDGA (denoted as MaskDGA re-train) and re-training
using DeepDGA (denoted as DeepDGA re-train).
In MaskDGA re-train each DGA classifier (i.e., the targeted
model) is initially trained on the same training set as described in
Section 5.2. Then, we randomly selected one hundred AGD names
from each of the twenty DGA families (2,000 domains in total) and
applied the MaskDGA on them. The targeted model was then re-
trained for two additional epochs on a new training set that consists
of the original training set and the 2,000 adversarial samples.
In order to apply DeepDGA re-train, we first trained the Deep-
DGA GAN architecture using 500k benign domain names and out-
put 63,500 pseudo-random domain names. As suggested by Ander-
son et al. [3], we extend the training set of the targeted model with
these domain names which are labeled as the “benign” class, in
order to defend against adversarial attacks.
Distillation networks [33] were proposed as a defense against
adversarial perturbation that uses a special parameter called the
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“distillation temperature” T . Setting high temperature values (e.g.,
T = 10): for the softmax layer as induces smoother decision bounds
as follows:
Softmax(X ,T ) =
[
ezi (X )/T∑N−1
l=0 e
zl (X )/T
]
i ∈0..N−1
where Softmax(X ,T ) is the softmax layer,T is the temperature, and
zi is the i-th logit. After training the initial network with a high
distillation temperature, the softmax values obtained (denoted as
“soft labels”) are now used to train a new network (denoted as the
“distilled network”) which is more resistant to attacks.
As a general adversarial defense, distillation networks have been
evaluated on adversarial attacks against the MNIST [26] and CIFAR-
10 [24] datasets and for both the effectiveness of the attacks dropped
from a 95% of misclassification rate to less than 5%. The main
intuition regarding the reduced effectiveness of attacks is that the
distilled soft labels allow samples that are in between labels (e.g.,
a figure of the digit ’3’ that resembles an ’8’) to be classified near
the decision boundary instead of in the center, which makes the
trained model vulnerable to attacks.
Our implementation of the distillation defense relies on the im-
plementation of [10], in which the same temperature was used for
both the initial and distilled networks, respectively named teacher
and student. Moreover, setting the temperature to values that are
larger than 40, as was done on images in [33], failed to converge for
DGA detection in which the classes of samples more often overlap.
Therefore, we set the temperature to 10.
6.3 Results
Table 5 presents the average F1-score measure of the four models in
the cases of NoAttack ,DeepDGA attack, andMaskDGA attack, and
when no defense is applied (NoDe f ense), when using MaskDGA
retrain, DeepDGA retrain, and Distillation.
The results presented in Section 5.6 indicate that, when no de-
fense is applied, the models are vulnerable to domain names that
were generated by the DeepDGA attack and even more vulnerable
to to domain names that were generated by MaskDGA.
The distillation network defense slightly improves the F1-scores
against all attacks and across all models but is inefficient overall.
The primary reason for the inefficiency of the distillation defense is
that it is designed for general misclassification (i.e., misclassification
for any other class other than the correct classY ) and not a targeted
misclassification (i.e., a misclassification for a specific class Y ′).
The DeepDGA retrain defense significantly improve the robust-
ness of the targeted models against the DeepDGA attack for three
of the four models (all but CMU). The DeepDGA hardening is inef-
fective against the MaskDGA evasion technique, but it comes with
the cost of reducing the effectiveness of detecting non-adversarial
AGD names.
The MaskDGA retrain defense provides the highest average F1-
score results on all of the attacks and for all targeted models. The
effectiveness of detecting non-adversarial AGD names is still re-
duced in comparison to the targeted models without any defense,
but overall it has better results on average, than the alternatives
of DeepDGA hardening and distillation networks. The effective-
ness of the defense against the DeepDGA attack has an average
F1-score of 0.6675, which is better than the effectiveness of the
DeepDGA retrain defense against the MaskDGA evasion technique.
This suggests that overall, the defenses do not fully prevent general
adversarial attacks against DGA classifiers.
7 PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
MASKDGA
Resilient communication between bots and their command and
control server using a DGA is normally established as follows. The
bot operator and the bots have an implementation of the DGA
mechanism in their source code and share a secret input seed. Pe-
riodically, the botnet operator executes the DGA with the secret
input seed to generate a large number of domain names and at-
tempts to register them. The domain names that are successfully
registered, are configured by the bot operator to resolve to the com-
mand and control system. In turn, the bot executes the DGA with
the shared secret input seed to generate the same list of domain
names that was generated by the bot operator. The bot iterates the
generated domain names and attempts to connect each one of them
until it receives a reply from from the command and control server.
The bot that executes the DGA might reside on hosts which have
limited computational and storage resources (e.g., IoT devices or
point-of-sale machines). Therefore, it is important to understand
the practical implementation of the presented evasion technique in
order to understand its requirements and limitations.
Table 5: Evaluation of the effectiveness of the adversarial de-
fenses (average F1-score).
Defense / Attack No Attack DeepDGA MaskDGA
CNN[Invincea]
No defense 1.00 0.84 0.39
Distillation 1.00 0.85 0.42
DeepDGA retrain 0.87 0.97 0.40
MaskDGA re-train 0.96 0.72 0.96
LSTM[Endgame]
No defense 0.98 0.74 0.53
Distillation 0.98 0.74 0.52
DeepDGA retrain 0.96 0.88 0.57
MaskDGA retrain 0.95 0.77 0.91
biLSTM[CMU]
No defense 0.98 0.78 0.55
Distillation 0.98 0.86 0.51
DeepDGA retrain 0.94 0.48 0.54
MaskDGA retrain 0.93 0.64 0.85
CNN + LSTM[MIT]
No defense 0.95 0.74 0.51
Distillation 0.58 0.45 0.58
DeepDGA retrain 0.91 0.92 0.49
MaskDGA retrain 0.91 0.54 0.80
Evaluation of the average F1-score of targeted models when
applying the distillation, DeepDGA retrain and adversarial retrain
defenses.
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Table 6: Practical implementation requirements.
Requirement Memory Supported platforms
TF Lite 300KB Android / Embedded / Desktop
Model 10MB -
Input Repr. 2.4KB / AGD -
JSM Repr. 38.4KB / AGD -
The platform and memory requirements of a bot to execute
MaskDGA. A bot would load a pre-trained substitute model using
TensorFlow Lite that is supported on various environments and
represent every AGD input and output JSM representation as a
binary character-level matrix in memory.
MaskDGA requires the bot to generate a set of AGD, use a substi-
tute model to perform a feed-forward step and back-propagation to
acquire the JSM, and add perturbation based on the JSM.We assume
that bots that have previously used DGAs are capable of generating
a set of AGD names. Therefore, the main focus of this section the
requirements of representing the AGD names as character-level
binary matrices, loading a previously trained substitute model, and
computing the JSM. The list of requirements is summarized in
Table 6.
The longest AGD name in the rich DMD-2018 dataset has 65
characters, and the number of allowed symbols for domain names in-
clude case-insensitive English letters, digits, hyphens, underscores
and dots, for an overall of 39 symbols. There a binary character-
level representation of 65 · 39 = 2535 entries of bits is sufficient for
the representation every single AGD name.
The substitute model that we trained can be serialized to the
HDF5 binary serialization format 3 and later re-loaded with Tensor-
Flow. Since TensorFlow’s development libraries often exceeds 100
MB, TensorFlow Lite 4 can be used. TensorFlow Lite weighs less
than 300 KB and is designed to load pre-trained models on Android,
embedded devices and Desktops and supports various program-
ming languages such as:: C, C++, Java and Python. The substitute
model that was trained in Section 4.2 had 160,853 parameters and
is serialized to a 10MB HDF5 file.
For every AGD name the attacker is required to perform a single
feed-forward step and a single back-propagation which is negligible
in computation resources (since no training is required). The result
of the backpropagation is the JSM matrix of gradients that has
a similar number of entries to that of the input representation
(2,535), but in contrast, every entry has 16 bits instead of a single
bit. Therefore, the overall JSM representation has slightly less than
38.4KB per AGD name.
8 CONCLUSIONS
This study portrays an adversarial machine learning evasion tech-
nique on DGA classifiers. The evaluation of the evasion technique
on four state of the art, recently published DGA classifiers indi-
cates that their performance degrades significantly. MaskDGA is
evaluated along with two other attacks, DeepDGA and random,
which also resulted in a degradation in the performance of the
3https://www.h5py.org/
4https://www.tensorflow.org/lite/overview
DGA classifiers, although to a lesser extent than that caused by the
MaskDGA. The performance degradation caused by the random
attack helps us argue that character-level DGA classifiers memo-
rize specific lexicographic patterns of known DGA and thus are
extremely vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
The GAN architecture used by DeepDGA (1) requires extensive
hyper-parameter tuning, (2) does not easily converge, and therefore
is unstable and unexpected, (3) requires an approximation tech-
nique to address the discrete values of the input (i.e., the domain
name), and (4) was trained to generate domains based on legitimate
character distribution, and therefore is likely to generate benign (al-
ready registered) domain names. On the other hand, the MaskDGA
technique is (1) designed specifically for generating malicious do-
mains (i.e., the substitute model is trained using both legitimate and
malicious domains) and is therefore more successful, (2) requires
minimal tuning (it only requires training a simple substitute model),
and (3) is applied as a wrapper on the original DGAmechanism used
by the botnet. Moreover, MaskDGA can be executed by bots with
limited resources as long as they install TensorFlow lite (supported
on multiple platforms) and load a pre-trained model that weighs
less than 10MB, thus making the evasion technique practical for
botnets.
Additionally, we tested MaskDGA and the DeepDGA attack
against three adversarial defenses, namely: MaskDGA re-training,
DeepDGA re-training and distillation networks. We conclude that
distillation is ineffective against targeted misclassifications. The
DeepDGA retraining was effective against the DeepDGA attack but
caused the targeted model to degrade against non-adversarial AGD
names. Finally, MaskDGA re-training on the MaskDGA adversarial
samples had better results on average, but it still does not provide a
perfect defense against other adversarial attacks such as DeepDGA.
These results demonstrate the vulnerability of character-level DGA
classifiers to adversarial attacks and potential solutions to that are
further discussed in Section 10.
9 RELATEDWORKS
The concept of using adversarial learning for generating malicious
adversarial samples was previously investigated by [20, 38, 39, 44]
for generating malware that evade machine learning-based anti-
malware software and [14, 17] for evading text classifiers.
DeepDGA [3] extended these studies to the area of DGA detec-
tion by proposing a generative adversarial learning application that
generates pseudo-random domain names that appear legitimate
and thus can be used to augment the benign class in the training
set for classification robustness. DeepDGA can be regarded as both
an evasion technique that produces pseudo-random domain names
and as a defense mechanism for classification robustness. As an
evasion technique, DeepDGA is impractical for botnets as the gener-
ated domains are short and readable and therefore either expensive
or not available for carrying out large attacks by botnets. Moreover,
the performance of MaskDGA is superior to that of DeepDGA and
simpler to implement and tune, since it is based on a discriminative
model which is less complicated computationally than generative
models.
Character-level adversarial attacks were previously suggested in
HotFlip [16] to cause misclassification of words by text classifiers in
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the white-box adversarial setting by replacing, inserting or deleting
a single character. In contrast, the presented evasion technique
is applied in a black-box adversarial setting in which a substitute
model is trained. Also, deleting or inserting characters is forbidden
to avoid the generation of longer domain names which are sensitive
to detection and short domain names which are more expensive
and less available. In addition, in MaskDGA the replacement of
characters is performed on half of the characters, where every char-
acter is replaced once, in order to preserve a unique set of generated
domains. In contrast, HotFlip always focuses on the character that
induces the highest gradient since there’s no restriction of replacing
multiple words to the same words. For example, the words “open,”
“pea,” and “ten” can all change to the word “pen” in a single flip,
but MaskDGA ensures that the chances of outputting the same
domain is small, resulting in a larger unique domain names, and
accordingly making it difficult to detect all of the generated domain
names.
10 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
Character-level DGA classifiers gained popularity largely due to
their simplicity, the availability of training data, and the ability to
use them for real-time detection. We therefore aimed at evaluating
the robustness of these classifiers against evasion techniques. Since
the evaluation of MaskDGA indicates the vulnerability of these
classifiers, we propose potential solutions for improved robustness.
Firstly, DGA classifiers can improve their robustness against adver-
sarial attacks using additional contextual features (e.g., DNS traffic
features and WHOIS features [5, 13, 41]) are also being used for
classification. Another approach for robustness should focus on
DGA detection systems that would detect domain names with novel
lexicographic representation that implies the existence of either a
new DGA process, a new secret seed or an adversarial attack.
MaskDGA can be generalized for other security scenarios, as
well as non-security scenarios, in which character-level classifiers
attempt to predict the malice of a sample. For example, phishing
URLs classifiers can re-crafted using the presented technique to
evade detection, and malware strings can be automatically replaced
to overcome signature-based anti-malware tools. We believe that
using MaskDGA for adversarial re-training can improve the robust-
ness of the models in these cases as well.
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